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I.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, no provisions of a merger agreement' involving a
t Attorney, Faegre & Benson LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota. BA 1992,
University of Minnesota; JD 1995, Harvard Law School. The ideas expressed in
this article are solely those of the author and not of Faegre & Benson. I wish to
thank Phil Garon and Alex Tselos for their helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this article and B.J. Nodzon and Kim Kantorowicz for their valuable research
assistance. Special thanks go to Michelle and Sophie Stanchfield.
1. This article will refer exclusively to merger agreements. Although a
merger is not the only method of acquiring all the capital stock of a public corporation, it is the only practical one. Tender offers (without a second-step merger),
asset acquisitions, and direct purchases are either impracticable due to the high
number of widely dispersed stockholders of the target, the necessity of obtaining
third-party consents, or tax considerations.
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publicly held target corporation, other than those dealing with
price, are as heavily negotiated or arouse such intense debate
among the participants as those governing what actions the board
of directors of the target may take in the face of a higher acquisition offer that is made after the agreement is executed. Often lost
in the analysis of the intricacies of the limitations upon "fiduciary
outs" 2 from the performance of the merger agreement in the event

of a higher offer or of the consequences of exercising the out is the
threshold question of whether such an out is prescribed by law or
merely an optional contractual provision, to be included or excluded from a merger agreement based on the parties' information
and bargaining power. Depending on the state of the target company's incorporation, the answer to this threshold question may be
viewed as either unknown or turning on issues of the nature of the
decision to sell (i.e., for strategic or purely financial reasons) or of
the ownership of the resulting entity (i.e., whether there will be a
controlling stockholder or whether control will be maintained by
dispersed public stockholders). Even in jurisdictions such as Delaware, where there is a substantial body of relevant case law, these
latter two factors are not dispositive.
Part I of this article will first briefly analyze the nature of fiduciary outs and the context in which they are used. Part II will present the argument that fiduciary outs are not (and should not be)
required by law in all contexts, with a particular focus on Delaware
corporate law because of the large number of publicly held corporations incorporated in that state' and the body of widely followed
court decisions that result from that fact.4 This argument applies
2. Although often a misnomer, as this article will address, such a right of
termination or forgiveness of certain covenants contained in the merger agreement is commonly referred to as a "fiduciary out." Because it is such a widely used
phrase, rightly or wrongly, this article will employ it as a convenient shorthand
term.
3. More than forty percent of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware, as are over eighty percent of the publicly
traded Fortune 500 companies. Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Forewordto 1 R.
FRANKIN BALOTrI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1997).
4. There is scant decisional authority in other jurisdictions regarding the
permissibility of a merger agreement with no fiduciary outs (sometimes called an
"exclusive" merger agreement), although there are some notable exceptions. E.g.,
Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir. 1984)
(California law) (holding that a board of directors may lawfully agree in a merger
agreement to forbear from accepting third-party bids until the stockholders' vote
occurs); ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576, 587 (Neb. 1986) (deciding
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whether or not the target corporation is selling for strategic or financial reasons and whether or not the merger will result in a controlling stockholder of the surviving corporation. Despite recent
judicial opinions in Delaware questioning the validity of merger
agreements with no fiduciary outs, this article contends that the
decisions may be explained by two factors: the amount of information relating to the market for acquisition of the corporation possessed by the target board of directors before entering into the
merger agreement, and the "lock-up "a provisions that operate to
deter or even preclude third-party acquisition offers. There is often a failure to distinguish between the question of whether the
board of directors of a target corporation must have the right to
exercise a fiduciary out to consider a higher third-party offer versus
the consequences of the exercise of that right, including the triggering of the lock-up provisions. Part III of this article discusses the
consequences to stockholders and to the legal system of the conclusion that fiduciary outs are not legally required in all contexts
and the reasons why fiduciary outs will nevertheless very often be
included in merger agreements, whether at the insistence of the
target or even the acquiring corporation.

II.
A.

FIDUCIARY OUTS

The Context

Long before a merger agreement is signed and the transaction
is publicly announced, the acquiring corporation (and, to a lesser
extent, the target corporation) has heavily invested in the deal.
Whether measured in out-of-pocket expenses, investments of management's time and attention, or opportunity costs of foregoing
other promising potential targets, this investment can be substan-

that a target board may not agree to "best efforts" clause regarding the stockholder-approval process in the absence of a fiduciary out).
5. "Lock-ups," as they will be broadly called in this article, suggest certainty
of consummation, but in fact fall into a range from simple liquidated damages,
which would not deter most potential third-party bidders, to stock or "crown jewel"
options that would arguably deter nearly all. Although some would include the
prohibitions on considering unsolicited third-party offers discussed in this article
to fall into the broad category of lock-ups, this article will treat the two categories
as distinct, with lock-ups only encompassing devices that could result in a wealth
transfer from the target corporation to its initial merger partner. Lock-ups may be
terms of the merger agreement itself or may be set forth in a separate document
such as an option agreement or a voting agreement coupled with an irrevocable
proxy.
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tial. The unique strategic or synergistic advantages of the proposed
merger, as perceived by the acquiring corporation (and sometimes
the target corporation), also are frequently of significant valueone of the reasons why injunctive relief may be granted to prevent
breach of a merger agreement, as opposed to after-the-fact monetary damages being the sole remedy of an aggrieved merger partner proposed to be left for another suitor.
In order to protect its investment and the perceived benefits of
the merger, the board of directors of the acquiring corporation will
often seek to push the limits on reducing or eliminating the target
board of directors' ability to terminate either the merger agreement itself or merely some provisions of it, whether due to changed
circumstances or an intervening unsolicited third-party bid. Numerous events may occur between the negotiation and execution of
the merger agreement and the meeting of the target corporation's
(and sometimes the acquiring corporation's) stockholders to approve it, which often may not occur until two to four months (or
longer) after the agreement is executed. Depending on the nature
of the parties (publicly held or private), the type of consideration
being paid (stock, other securities, or cash), and the workload of
the Securities and Exchange Commission's staff, the solicitation
and disclosure document required to be sent to the target corporation's stockholders may be tied up for months in the SEC's review
process. 6 Once the document is through the SEC, it must be
mailed at least twenty business days before the stockholders meeting in certain circumstances.7 Regulated industries, such as financial institutions, may not be able to obtain the necessary regulatory
approvals for several months. Proposed strategic mergers between

6. The staff of the SEC has discretion whether to review a merger proxy
statement or registration statement (Form S-4 or F-4). Abba David Poliakoff, SEC
Review: Comfort or Illusion?, 17 U. BALT. L. REv. 40, 43-46 (1987). If the staff elects
to review a merger filing, its stated goal is to provide an initial comment letter
within 30 days of filing. William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 52 Bus. LAw. 65, at n.5 (1996). Typically, however, the receipt of the initial comments is merely the first stage of a two-to-four round process of back-and-forth comments and responses. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURrTIES REGULATION 210 (3d ed. 1989).
7. This occurs when either party seeks to "incorporate by reference" the volume of its other SEC filings in the disclosure document. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101,
Note D(3) (2000); General Instruction A(2) to SEC Registration Statement Forms
S-4 and F-4. Pursuant to regulations adopted under the Williams Act, a waiting
period of 20 business days is applied to all tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1
(2000).
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dominant players in a given market may be subject to substantial
delays resulting from the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission's antitrust review. Any of these delays gives ample time for changed circumstances, such as a decline in the value
of the acquiring corporation's stock that it plans to use as the
merger consideration, whether due to general market conditions
or entity-specific developments, or for a third party to announce its
intent to top the acquiring corporation's offer, such as in the
highly publicized fight in early 2000 involving American Home
Products, Warner-Lambert, and Pfizer. The combination of these
factors results in the acquiring corporation's investment being
placed at risk for what may seem like forever to its management.
B.

The Practice

An initial question that one may ask regarding fiduciary outs is
what are they are "outs" from? There is not a single answer to this
question, as there are four distinct but related aspects of a typical
merger agreement where the target corporation's board of directors' promises may conflict with the target stockholders' desire for
a higher-priced offer. First is the limitation on the target corporation or its affiliates' discussing, entertaining, accepting, or providing confidential information to one considering a third-party offer
after the agreement is executed. Second, the merger agreement
will usually mandate that the target directors and management use
their best efforts (or some variation of that standard) to satisfy all of
the conditions to closing the merger, including regulatory approvals, contractual consents, and the stockholder vote. A typical third
provision is for the target board to agree that, in the required
proxy statement and thereafter, it will recommend that stockholders vote to approve the merger agreement (and no other) and will
call a stockholder meeting for that purpose. Finally, a target board
of directors may have the option to terminate the merger agreement itself and get out of the deal altogether. A merger agreement
may contain an out for the target board from any or all of these
provisions. The exercise of one of these outs by the target corporation is not free, however. There is virtually always tied to the exercise of such provisions (other than the out from prohibitions on
third-party discussions or information disclosure) a termination fee
8. E.g., Robert Langreth et al., Warner-Lambert Concedes Pfizer Bid May Be Better
Than An AHP Merger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2000, at A3.
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or other method of compensating the acquiring corporation for its
sunk costs and lost opportunities.
Despite the importance and attention that practitioners give to
negotiating fiduciary outs, many do so without considering whether
they are required by law or merely optional contractual provisions,
to be included only if the circumstances so warrant. For example, a
not-uncommon formulation of the fiduciary out states that the directors may terminate the merger agreement or withdraw their
recommendation that stockholders vote to approve the merger if
the directors are required by their fiduciary duties to take such actions.9 Feeling that this formulation of the fiduciary out may have
been too flexible and permissive for the target corporation, some
acquirers have attempted to limit the target board's discretion by
requiring that the board obtain an opinion of counsel to the effect
that the directors would breach their duties to the stockholders
unless they exercise an out from the agreement. 0 But unchecked
discretion is merely one of the potential problems of drafting a fiduciary out using such circular language.
For a contractual provision that often takes up a great amount
of time and energy, and often has important consequences, when
compared to the other terms of the merger agreement, the first
approach described in the preceding paragraph appears to leave
much to chance. Some practitioners may believe that they are acting efficiently by incorporating into the merger agreement the
body of relevant corporate law governing directors' conduct rather
than restating it or freezing it at a given point in time. Others may
believe that they are acting prudently by ensuring that, depending
on which side of the transaction they are on, they are either obtaining the maximum flexibility to terminate the agreement or their
recommendation in the face of a better offer (in the case of the
target) or limiting the target's ability to terminate to the bare
minimum of those situations where the law absolutely requires it
(in the case of the acquirer). Both views cannot be correct. Nevertheless, these practitioners believe that, in either case, they are protected because a court cannot later determine that their agreement
violates the relevant legal standards if those standards are incorpo9. Hence the common name for the provision. E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994).
10. A recent Delaware case has invalidated this element of the fiduciary out,
however. ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999), discussed infra at the text accompanying notes 55-62.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss4/12
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rated into the agreement itself. This certainty may be upset, however, if the governing state law does not provide that a corporate
board of directors must have the ability to terminate a deal that
turns out, in hindsight, to have been a poor one.
Some have recognized this uncertainty and circularity, however. A number of commentators now advise that it may be unwise
for both acquiring and target corporations to rely on what a court
may or may not determine directors' fiduciary duties require, including the possibility that the court may determine that the state's
corporate law does not provide directors the right to terminate a
poor agreement in the face of a better one. In response to these
admonitions, it is now common practice for attorneys negotiating a
merger agreement to avoid murky concepts such as what a board's
fiduciary duties require and instead to specifically delineate the
terms on which the target corporation's board of directors may exercise a fiduciary out. Common provisions often include most of
the following factors: an unsolicited offer from a third party is received by the target corporation or is publicly announced by the
third-party bidder; the target's board of directors, after consulting
with its legal and financial advisers, determines that the third-party
offer is more valuable than the current transaction; and the target
board believes that there is a reasonable likelihood that the thirdparty offer, if accepted, will be able to be consummated." Sometimes, the acquirer will negotiate for a limited window of time14
offer.
(such as five days) during which it may match the usurper's
Others get more creative and ask for such conditions as the acquirer's right to be kept fully informed of developments concerning the third-party offer at all times or even to have a representative
of the acquirer be present (in person or via conference call) at all
Paul S. Bird & Andrew L. Bab, Anatomy of the No-Shop Provision, 12 No. 8
2, 4-5 (1998);John F. Johnston & Frederick H. Alexander, Fiduciary Outs
and Exclusive Merger Agreements-DelawareLaw and Practice,11 No. 2 Insights 15, 1819 (1997).
12. Bird& Bab, supra note 11.
13. Id. at 6.
14. ACELtd., 747 A.2d at 100. Contrary to intuition, this right to match may
actually work to the target corporation's benefit by causing a bidder to top its
competitor by a meaningful amount, rather than engaging in a series of incremental price increases and resulting five-day waiting periods. The recent bidding
war for Funco, Inc. conducted by Barnes & Noble and Electronics Boutique is an
example of such a provision working to the target's advantage in that manner.
Philip S. Garon, Maximizing ShareholderValue: The Funco Experience, FAEGRE & BENSON LLP CLIENT NEWSL. (Faegre & Benson LLP, Minneapolis, Minn.), Aug. 2000.
11.

INSIGHTS
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negotiations regarding the other offer. The imagination of acquirers and their attorneys, tempered by the risk of judicial review, is
the only limitation on how a fiduciary out may be crafted.
Although these more-specific "superior offer"' 5 formulations of
the fiduciary out provide greater certainty for the parties than the
circular definition of such a provision, many negotiators nevertheless start their discussions with the premise that the target's board
of directors must have an out-the only issue is how to define and
circumscribe it. Part II of this article argues that that baseline
premise is mistaken and that there is no such clear legal requirement. Before beginning that argument, however, it is first necessary to briefly review some fundamental points of law regarding directors' fiduciary duties in the merger context.
C. The BackgroundLaw
It is black letter law that corporate directors owe a fiduciary
duty to their stockholders. This duty takes two forms: the duty of
care (i.e., the exercise of a level of care that a prudent person
would exercise in the management of his or her own affairs) 16 and
the duty, of. loyalty 17(i.e., the absence of self-interest in the exercise of
one's judgment) . The fiduciary out may be seen as advancing
both aspects of directors' fiduciary duties. With respect to the duty
of care, the fiduciary out may serve as additional insurance against
a claim by aggrieved stockholders that the board of directors was
negligent in failing to maximize the purchase price for the corporation, where the courts have
. 18 determined that such pricemaximization is legally required. If no superior offer is forthcoming during the delay between execution of the merger agreement
and the stockholders' meeting to approve it, in the absence of
other contractual provisions that may unduly deter such an offer,
how can one reasonably claim that the board could have obtained a
better price for the corporation under current conditions? The fiduciary out also serves as a check against director self-interest in

15. As so called by Bird & Bab, supra note 11, at 5, andJohnston & Alexander,
supra note 11, at 19 & n.40.
16.

ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw

§

3.4 (1986); MINN. STAT.

§

302A.251,

subd. 1 (West 2000 Supp.). Delaware courts have defined the duty as the absence
of gross negligence. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
17. CLARK, supra note 16, § 4.1.
18. Infra text accompanying notes 20-22.
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that any pro-management deal struck with a favored party'9 will
likely be topped in the market for corporate acquisitions, again assuming no contractual provisions making such a topping bid too
costly.
When a corporation is to be broken up or when an acquisition
will result in a change of control from the unaffiliated mass of public stockholders to a single stockholder or group, the Delaware
courts have created a rule that the directors' fiduciary duties require them to maximize the price paid for the corporation; this is
the so-called "Revlon duty."20 Underlying this duty is the courts'
concern that the break-up or the change of control of a corporation results in the stockholders of the corporation losing the ability
to realize a premium for their shares.2 The merger is the stockholders' last chance at obtaining such a premium. In contrast,
where the surviving corporation in a merger will continue to be
held by widely dispersed public stockholders, including the former
stockholders of the target corporation, the target stockholders may
yet enjoy the payment of a control premium for their shares when
the acquiring company is itself sold. 2 The satisfaction of directors'
Revlon duties requires the care of an informed and deliberative
process and the loyalty of avoiding favoring a potential bidder for
reasons other than the stockholders' best interests.
After Revlon, there arose and developed a dichotomy 2 in the
19. A party may be favored because it offers to keep certain members of the
board of directors or management in place, because it shifts some of the acquisition price from the stockholders to management by means of lucrative employment or consulting contracts, or because of directors' subjective beliefs about one
potential acquirer's reputation and intent versus another.
20. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986); see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994). Unlike Delaware, the statutory law of a number of states
allows directors evaluating a merger to consider other corporate constituencies
such as employees, creditors, and the community. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.251,
subd. 5 (2000). It is unclear how such a statute would be interpreted. Could the
directors of a Minnesota corporation, having agreed to sell the corporation for
cash, reject a substantially higher third-party bid because that bidder indicates its
plan to close all the corporation's plants in the state and move them elsewhere?
Although the statutory language would seem to indicate that the directors' decision would be permissible, no court has yet been called upon to make this determination. See 18 JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S. GARON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.2, at 287 (1996).
21. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
22. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del.
1989).
23. A third standard of review, that of "entire fairness," applies when the
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level of judicial scrutiny applied by the Delaware courts when ana24
lyzing directors' conduct in the merger context. When a corporation is in the "Revlon zone," that is, when it is to be broken up or
sold to a person or group that will control the acquiring corporation's stock after the transaction, the Delaware courts will analyze
the board of directors' conduct using an enhanced level of scrutiny
that focuses on whether the directors acted reasonably in obtaining
25
the best value for stockholders. Outside of the Revlon zone, directors' actions are subject to the less-rigorous and highly deferential
26
business judgment rule.
Because of this distinction in the Delaware courts' standard of
review between Revlon transactions and those that do not involve a
change of control from the ever-changing mass of public stockholders, most practitioners believe that the inclusion of one of
more fiduciary outs in an acquisition agreement is a necessity when
a target corporation is in the Revlon zone. Many of those practitioners, but not all, would, however, be reasonably comfortable advising a board of directors considering a strategic stock-for-stock

board of directors or a controlling stockholder has a conflict of interest in the
proposed transaction. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
Because most cases questioning exclusive merger agreements turn on questions of
the duty of care, the entire-fairness standard is typically not relevant for this discussion.
24. Although this apparent bright-line division makes life easier for attorneys
advising merger participants, it may be less certain than it first seems. It may serve
as a useful heuristic device when comparing opposite transactions such as a sale of
a corporation for cash with a stock-for-stock merger of two publicly held corporations of nearly equal size with no acquisition premium. The distinction becomes
less clear, however, when the stockholders of the target corporation will make up
only a tiny percentage of the surviving corporation after a stock-for-stock merger.
For stockholders such as these, the acquisition may be their last chance to control
(indirectly) their receipt of a control premium, even if there is no controlling
stockholder post-deal. This is because the post-acquisition performance of the
target will do little to affect the sale price of the acquirer when it itself is sold and
because of the limited power of the former target stockholders to influence the
management of the acquirer. This area of the law is unsettled and continuing to
develop.
25. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
26. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150. The business judgment rule derives from
the Delaware statute vesting in the board of directors the authority to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (1999).
The rule has been stated by the Delaware Supreme Court as follows: "[the rule] is
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984).
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transaction, especially if the parties were close in size and little or
no control premium
was being
paid, 27 that a fiduciary out to the
•
.
agreement is not a legal requirement. Part III of this article will
present the argument that this distinction in practice does not always accurately track what is required by law.
III. No LEGAL MANDATE
A.

Statutory Law

Before 1998, the question of whether a fiduciary out was required in a merger agreement was an unsettled question under
Delaware law. The Delaware merger statute,"' like the merger statutes of all other states, requires that the board of directors act as a
gatekeeper for mergers; stockholders cannot approve a merger
unless the board has done so first. 29 Until 1998, the Delaware
merger statute had been interpreted by some as requiring as a
condition for the stockholder vote that the board of directors continue to recommend that the stockholders approve the merger
agreement right up until the vote;3° stockholders could not approve
a merger in the absence of such a continuing recommendation
even if they wanted to. Thus, a board of directors faced with a
higher third-party bid for the corporation, yet bound by a merger
agreement without a fiduciary out, would face a serious dilemma:
either continue to recommend that the original transaction be approved even though they themselves do not believe it to be in the
best interests of the stockholders, thereby violating their duty of
candor-an element of the duty of loyalty'-to the stockholders,
or violate the agreement and suffer the consequences of a breachof-contract suit. Neither choice was appealing.
In July 1998, however, the Delaware statute was amended to
E.g., 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERIcA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND
§ 5A.03[3] (2000 Supp.). Recent decisions of the Delaware Court of
Chancery may have diminished this comfort level, however. See also infra notes 5174 and accompanying text.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1999).
29. This general rule does not apply, however, in those states that allow
stockholders, by unanimous written agreement, to bypass the board's authority to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation or to act in lieu of the board.
E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.201, 302A.457 (2000). Such agreements are obviously
wholly impracticable for a publicly held corporation.
30. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858, 888 (Del. 1985).
31. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 703, 710 (Del. 1983).
27.

FREEZEOUTS
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state that a merger agreement may provide that it be submitted to
the stockholders for approval even if the board of directors deems
it no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders vote
against it. Before analyzing the complicated web of Delaware decisional law in the merger context, it should be noted that this
statutory amendment provides a strong base from which to argue
that there is no legal requirement that there be a fiduciary out to
terminate the agreement itself in every merger. 3 If there were an
implied-in-law right for a board of directors to terminate a merger
agreement due to the emergence of a higher offer, the statutory
language would be meaningless. The statute may not stand for the
proposition that the lack of a fiduciary out is a good idea, for either
the target or the acquirer, but it does support the conclusion that
certain types3 of fiduciary outs are not legal requirements.
B.

Caselaw

A trio of opinions by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985-86
ushered in a new level of substantive after-the-fact judicial review of
directors' actions in the mergers-and-acquisitions arena.35 Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,3 6 Van Gorkom,37 and Revlon

38

signaled an in-

creased willingness by the courts to give less deference to boards of
directors' actions in extraordinary corporate transactions. Although all three cases are of great importance, the Revlon case is

32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1999). Minnesota's corporate merger
statute was similarly amended in the summer of 1999. MINN. STAT. § 302A.613,
subd. 1 (2000).
33. Celia R. Taylor, A "DelicateInterplay": Resolving the Contract and Corporate
Law Tension in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561, 622 (1999).
34. Because a board of directors must continue to inform the stockholders of
the board's recommendation regarding whether or not the merger agreement
should be approved, the statutory amendment does not advance the argument
that there need not be an out to the target board's agreement to recommend the
merger or to refrain from providing confidential information regarding the corporation to a potential third-party bidder. Cf Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax
Co., Nos. CIV.A.17398, CIV.A.17383, CIV.A.17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (discussing the requirement of the target board's continuing
and informed recommendation regarding how stockholders should vote); see also
infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
35. William T. Allen, UnderstandingFiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an
Anomalous Concept, 55 Bus. LAW. 653, 654-55 (2000).
36. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
37. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
38. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
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arguably the best known.
Revlon involved a hostile bid for Revlon by Panty Pride, Inc. after the former rebuffed the latter's desire for a negotiated acquisition. Following the implementation of various defensive tactics to
hinder the unwanted takeover attempt, which the Revlon board of
directors had determined was at an inadequate price, the Revlon
board agreed to a leveraged acquisition of the company by a "white
knight," Forstmann Little & Co. As part of its financing of the proposed acquisition, Forstmann planned to break up Revlon after
consummation of the acquisition and to sell certain of its divisions
to other interested parties. In order to protect Forstmann's
agreement to acquire Revlon, the acquisition agreement contained
a "crown jewel" option-that is, a lock-up option to acquire certain
of Revlon's prize divisions at a favorable price-and a promise to
deal exclusively with Forstmann for the acquisition of the company.
The Revlon court first analyzed the initial defensive measures
designed to thwart Panty Pride's hostile bid. Applying the standards of Unocal,3 9 the court found those measures to be reasonable
responses to a perceived threat against the corporation. After the
Revlon board had turned to Forstmann to rescue it from the hostile
grasp of Pantry Pride, however, it became clear that the corporation would be sold for its parts. Once the board made this decision, the court, in a widely cited metaphor, stated that "[t] he directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders
at a sale of the company. 4 ' Finding that the lock-up option and
the exclusivity provision granted to Forstmann Little were impediments to achieving the highest price reasonably obtainable for Revlon's stockholders, the court held that the Court of Chancery had
properly enjoined their application.42
Because a board of directors' actions are currently subject to
39. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d at 955 (holding that directors may enact defensive measures that are reasonable responses to a perceived threat to the corporation).
40. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81.
41. Id. at 182.
42. Id. at 183-84. Although some had believed that Revlon was highly context-

specific, applying only to cash purchases and corporate "bust-ups," the QVC court
held that view too narrow of a reading and that Revlon's enhanced judicial scrutiny
also would come into play upon a sale that, although leaving the corporate entity
intact, resulted in a change of corporate control from unaffiliated stockholders to
a single person or group. Paramount Communications, Inc v. QVC Network, Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994).
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more meaningful scrutiny in the Revlon context, this article will
turn its focus there instead of the more deferential Time-WarneC
arena. Based on the Delaware courts' paradigm of reviewing directors' conduct in the merger context, if the courts do not mandate a
fiduciary out when a corporation is in the Revlon zone, they certainly will not do so when there is no change of control and thus no
loss of the public stockholders' ability to receive a control premium
for their shares. If the directors' conduct satisfies the Delaware
courts' enhanced scrutiny test, it surely will not be second-guessed
under the deferential business judgment rule.
1. DelawareSupreme Court
Although the Delaware Court of Chancery recently decided a
string of three cases (discussed below) that play an important part
in the analysis of whether fiduciary outs are required in the merger
context, the leading Delaware Supreme Court opinion on this subject after Revlon is the 1994 QVC opinion. 44
QVC involved the proposed acquisition of Paramount Communications by Viacom Inc. The merger agreement between
Paramount and Viacom contained three elements that the court
subjected to enhanced scrutiny: a "no-talk"45 provision with a fiduciary out, which prohibited Paramount from entertaining a thirdparty offer unless the Paramount board was required by its fiduciary duties to do so; a termination fee of $100 million (or approximately 1.25% of the approximately $8 billion initial acquisition
price), which would be payable by Paramount if its board of directors terminated the agreement because of a third-party offer or
recommended a third-party transaction or if the Paramount stockholders voted against the merger; and an option that would have
allowed Viacom to purchase 19.9% of Paramount's common stock
43. Time may be thought of as the doctrinal opposite to Revlon and is widely
cited for the proposition that a board of directors may hold fast to its vision for the
future of the entity in the face of an unwanted acquisition bid either when the
corporation is not for sale or when it is a party to a strategic stock-for-stock merger
where there will be no controlling stockholder after the deal.
44. QVC, 637 A.2d at 34.
45. Although the contractual term was called a "no-shop" provision by the
QVC court, it actually prohibited not only Paramount's shopping for a better deal
but also its responding to, or providing confidential information that would assist,
an unsolicited bid. In the current nomenclature of the Delaware courts, this type
of contractual term is referred to as a "no-talk" provision. Infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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at a per-share price approximately equal to the per-share merger
consideration.
After the negotiated acquisition was announced, QVC Network
Inc. publicly stated its intention to commence a tender offer at a
price that was approximately 15% more than Viacom's offer. In
light of the unsolicited bid from QVC, the Paramount board, now
with increased leverage, went back to renegotiate its deal with Viacom. Although Viacom agreed to pay a higher price for Paramount, Paramount did not use its increased leverage to lessen or
eliminate the deterrent effect on third-party offers of the three
provisions noted by the court. After back-and-forth price increases
by potential acquirers, the Paramount board was confronted with a
$10 billion offer from QVC. Citing questions regarding QVC's financing and concerns that the no-talk provision limited it from inquiring further into that issue and the other elements of QVC's offer, however, the Paramount board rejected QVC's overtures and
clung to its deal with Viacom, even though Viacom was then offering to pay five percent less to acquire the company.
The Delaware Supreme Court, focusing on the three elements
of the Paramount-Viacom merger agreement that could deter or
preclude potential third-party bids, stated that those provisions
would be subject to the court's enhanced "reasonableness" test set
forth in Unocal. Building on Revlon, the court's justification for this
enhanced scrutiny was twofold: Paramount had agreed to a changeof-control transaction in that Viacom was controlled by a single
person (and would be so even after the consummation of the
merger) and the Paramount board had agreed to defensive measures to protect that transaction against unwanted third-party bids.46
At first blush, the strong language in QVC would lead one to
think that a fiduciary out is an absolute requirement in any Revlon
transaction. When discussing the no-talk provision of the Paramount-Viacom merger agreement, the court stated that, whether or
not the provision was presumptively valid or invalid in the abstract,
it might limit directors' • fiduciary duty to obtain
the highest value
47
reasonably obtainable for the stockholders.
Because the Paramount board had determined to sell control, it had a continuing
obligation to search for the best value for stockholders, which the
no-talk provision impermissibly hindered. 481
46.
47.

QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
Id. at 49 n.20.

48.

Id. at 48-49.
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The QVC decision was expressly limited to its facts. 4 9 Those
facts were particularly poor ones for a target board of directors facing judicial review: although the Paramount board had decided to
sell the company, it negotiated with only one favored bidder, without any canvass of the market; even if the Paramount board legitimately feared a public or private auction of the company, QVC had
already expressed an interest in acquiring Paramount, yet it was not
given the opportunity to top Viacom's offer; and the consequences
of termination included Viacom's right to exercise a "draconian"
stock option, one without limit on its value."° One cannot be certain that the Delaware Supreme Court would apply its holding in
QVC to a merger agreement that was not so tainted at the outset.
2.

Recent DelawareChancery Court Rulings

A one-month period in the fall of 1999 witnessed three different judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery hand down three
opinions that quickly caught the attention of practitioners and
commentators in the mergers-and-acquisitions arena. Each has its
own impact on directors' actions in this arena, and each bears on
the question of whether a fiduciary out is required in a merger
agreement. Each case focused on contractual provisions that limited or prohibited the target's board of directors from entertaining
unsolicited third-party offers. It is also interesting to note that each
case involved a negotiated stock-for-stock merger that did not involve a change of control and thus did not give rise to enhanced
judicial scrutiny under Revlon and QVC.
The first case, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.,51 is
not so memorable for its holding, but for a number of interesting
statements by Chancellor Chandler. The holding, that the court
would refuse to enter a preliminary injunction that was sought by a
third-party suitor against certain provisions of a merger agreement
because, as the court stated, the stockholders of the constituent
corporations could always vote against the merger, is not surprising
(although it is relevant to the issues discussed in Part IV of this article). The interesting dicta that caught practitioners' attention re49. The court noted numerous times that its holding was specific to the facts
before it and that certain contractual provisions may or may not be valid in other
contexts. Id. at 37, 45, 48, 51, and nn.13, 19 & 20.
50. Id. at 49 n.19.
51. Nos. CIV.A.17398, CIV.A.17383, CIV.A.17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1
(Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
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lated to two aspects of the merger agreement under consideration.
First, the court characterized the size of the fee (6.3% of the transaction value) payable to the acquiring corporation if the merger
agreement was terminated in the face of a competing bid as
stretching the bounds of reasonableness, possibly to the breaking
point.5 2 Second, and more to the point of this article, the court
stated that the third-party bidder faced a reasonable likelihood on
the success of its challenge to an agreement provision that not only
prohibited the target corporation from soliciting third-party bids,
but also from engaging in any discussions with, or providing confidential information to, a third party relating to an acquisition proposal, with no fiduciary out.5 3

In the words of the court, even

though the target corporation was governed by Time-Warner and
not by Revlon, this no-talk provision was "the legal equivalent of willful blindness, a blindness that may constitute a breach of the duty
of care; that is, the duty to take care to be informed of all material
information reasonably available." 54 These strong words, given in
the Time-Warnercontext, quickly received attention.
ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp.,5' came second in this trilogy of

cases and confirmed that the Phelps Dodge ruling did not represent
the views of a solitary judge. In an opinion written by Vice Chancellor Strine, the court refused to grant a temporary restraining order to prevent Capital Re Corporation from terminating its merger
agreement with ACE Limited. The two parties had negotiated a
stock-for-stock merger agreement that had two interesting provisions. First, in the face of hard times for Capital Re, ACE Limited
invested in Capital Re in exchange for approximately 12% of its
capital stock. Later, when it became apparent that this initial investment was not sufficient to turn the tide for Capital Re, its board
of directors agreed for the corporation to be acquired by ACE Limited. Building on ACE Limited's initial toe-hold, the merger
agreement was conditioned upon holders of approximately 34% of
Capital Re's stock entering into voting agreements under which
they were bound to vote for the merger if the corporation's board
52. Id. at *2.
53. The first aspect of the provision, the prohibition on solicitation, is often
referred to as a "no-shop" provision; the second aspect, the absolute bar on engaging in any discussions with, or providing information to, the maker of an unsolicited bid, is referred to by the Phelps Dodge court and others as a "no-talk" provision.

Id. at *1.
54. Id. at *2.
55.

747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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did not terminate the merger agreement in accordance with its
terms before the stockholders' meeting. Second, the fiduciary out
to the agreement's no-talk provision arguably mandated the Capital
Re board to base its decision that negotiating with a third party was
required in order to avoid breaching its fiduciary duties to stockholders on written advice of legal counsel to that effect.
In the three months between execution of the merger agreement and the meeting of Capital Re's stockholders to approve it,
ACE Limited's stock price declined dramatically, resulting in the
value of the ACE Limited stock that each Capital Re stockholder
would receive in the merger falling from over $17 per share to less
than $10. On the day before the stockholders' meeting, a thirdparty bidder publicly announced an all-cash offer for Capital Re
with a per-share purchase price of $12.50. During a hastily convened emergency meeting of Capital Re's board of directors, the
corporation's outside legal counsel gave the opinion that negotiating with the new bidder was "consistent with" the board's fiduciary
duties, but not that such negotiations were "required by" those duties, as ACE Limited argued the merger agreement required as a
condition for the exercise of the fiduciary out. Nevertheless, the
Capital Re board of directors itself determined that it was dutybound to negotiate with the other bidder. As a result of these negotiations, a bidding war for Capital Re ensued between the two
bidders, with ACE Limited finally putting a stop to it all by filing
the court action.
In deciding ACE Limited's breach-of-contract claim against
Capital Re, the court took a two-step approach. First, it asked
which interpretation of the merger agreement was a better reading:
either whether the board, after receiving written advice of legal
counsel (although equivocal on the issue), was itself justified in determining that its fiduciary duties to stockholders required it to entertain a higher offer or whether the board must base that decision
on unequivocal legal advice that such a result is mandated. 56 After
finding that the former was a better reading of the contact language, the court nevertheless analyzed the enforceability of what
ACE believed was its bargained-for interpretation that clear and
unequivocal written legal advice was required. Citing a thenforthcoming law review article by Professor Paul Regan 57 discussing
56.

Id. at 103.

57. Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOzO L. REv. 1 (1999).
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the tension in the law between the enforcement of the parties' contractual expectations and the principles of agency and trust law that
seek to protect a principal or a beneficiary when a contract is made
on his or her behalf, the court stated that many times
S51 the parties'
Citing
expectations must give way to greater societal interests.
three of the four factors59 identified by Professor Regan, the court
found that:
(1) ACE was a sophisticated party that should have known that
the no-talk provision, coupled with the voting agreements with a
large percentage of Capital Re stockholders, would constitute a
near-preclusive obstacle to any third-party bid; 60
(2) because the merger had not yet closed, the court would
not be put in a position of trying to unscramble it;61 and
(3) the public policy of ensuring directors' care and loyalty in
significant corporate events such as mergers outweighs the protection of the acquirer's contractual rights.
Vice Chancellor Strine's lengthy and thoughtful opinion
meant that Chancellor Chandler's oral statements in Phelps
Dodge could not be taken lightly.
The final case, In re IXC Communications,Inc. Stockholders Litiga63
tion, again revolved around, among other things, the no-talk provisions of a merger agreement. As in Phelps Dodge, the target corporation had agreed to a stock-for-stock merger that would not result
in a controlling stockholder; thus, the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon
did not apply to the judicial evaluation of the target board's conduct. Unlike the context of QVC and Phelps Dodge, however, the
target corporation had made public announcements before entering into the merger agreement that it was interested in entertaining offers for a merger or some other strategic alternative to remaining a stand-alone company. After engaging in discussions with
a number of potential suitors, which ranged from mere indications
of interest to actual negotiations, the target agreed to a merger
with the only potential purchaser that had stuck with the process to
the end.
58. ACELtd., 747A.2d at 104.
59. The court did not find the fourth factor, whether ACE's reliance interests
under the merger agreement warranted protection, to be relevant to its analysis.
60. ACE Ltd., 747 A.2d at 109.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Nos. C.A. 17324, C.A. 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27,
1999).
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The plaintiffs challenged the merger agreement's mutual notalk provision, which prohibited either party from entertaining alternative bids. Although the no-talk provision was later dropped in
favor of a mutual no-shop provision with a fiduciary out (seemingly
after the Phelps Dodge decision was handed down just one month
before), Vice Chancellor Steele still felt compelled to state his view
of the ill-fated provision: "Further, the assertion that the board
'willfully blinded' itself by approving the now defunct 'no-talk' provision in the Merger Agreement is unpersuasive, particularly considering how late in the process this provision came. Provisions
such as these are common in merger agreements and do not imply
some automatic breach of fiduciary duty.i The strong language in
Phelps Dodge began to look a little weaker, and practitioners became
a little more uncomfortable in predicting the decisions of the
Delaware courts.
Why did the IXC Communications court view the no-talk provision so differently than the court in Phelps Dodge? After all, hadn't
the XC Communications plaintiffs just parroted the language of the
Phelps Dodge opinion in their arguments? The next section analyzes
the body of Delaware caselaw on fiduciary outs and concludes that
the apparent schism in the decisions may be explained by reference to two factors.
3. Analysis Of The Delaware Caselaw
On its face, this review of the Delaware caselaw looks rather
bleak for counsel to an acquiring corporation when either negotiating a merger agreement with no fiduciary out for the target board
of directors or arguing to a court that the deal-protection terms of
such an agreement are valid. Even before the issuance of the trilogy of opinions of the Delaware Court of Chancery in late 1999, a
substantial majority of practitioners and commentators would have
relied on QVC and other cases and stated that the inclusion of a fiduciary out is an absolute legal requirement for a target corporation subject to the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon. After those three
cases, many if not most would also believe that a fiduciary out is a
must for a target corporation engaged in a strategic stock-for-stock
merger not resulting in a controlling stockholder and thus governed by the more deferential standard of Time-Warner. After October 1999, it appeared that the Delaware courts had reached the
64.

Id. at *6.
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finish line in the marathon that began in 1985 to extend their afterthe-fact review of directors' conduct in the merger context to include all types of transactions, prohibiting any contractual measures that would substantially curtail a target board's ability to inform itself regarding unsolicited third-party offers that could
provide a higher price to stockholders. Any target board of directors that did not include a fiduciary out in its merger agreement,
whether governed by Revlon or Time-Warner,would do so at its own
risk.65
Why, then, would such an eminent authority on Delaware corporate law as former Chancellor William Allen flatly state in early
2000 that "[n]ot every Revlon transaction requires a fiduciary out
provision"? Note that Chancellor Allen referred to Revlon, where
most had thought the issue settled the other way even before the
fall of 1999, not to Time-Warner, where, at least before the trio of
1999 Chancery Court opinions, there was some vigorous debate on
the issue. Perhaps the Delaware caselaw is not as clear as some
would believe.
Although not every court is as candid and explicit on the topic
as the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC, 6' the Delaware caselaw on
fiduciary outs is highly fact-specific. Even the Revlon/Time-Warner
distinction, in which some find comfort as a bright-line rule, often
creates a false dichotomy that only holds true at the polar opposite
ends of the change-of-control continuum on which merger-andacquisition transactions may fall. 68 Although the specific facts in
QVC or Phelps Dodge may have led the court to the correct result,
65. The "risk" referred to is almost exclusively the risk of equitable relief, either an injunction that would delay the transaction or the declaration that certain
contractual terms are unenforceable. After a merger has occurred and the "eggs
have been scrambled," a court would almost never unwind the transaction.
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., No.CIV.A. 16963, 2000 WL 516265, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 20, 2000). In addition, few directors face personal liability for damages resulting from the breach of the duty of care, as most corporations take advantage of
the Delaware statute that allows a corporation to eliminate such liability in its certificate of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1999). Looking at
what actually happens in practice, one can observe that few boards of directors are
willing to take the risk of even equitable relief, however. A 1997 article noted that
virtually every merger agreement involving a publicly held target includes a fiduciary out. Johnston & Alexander, supra note 11. Some of the reasons why are discussed in Part IV.
66. Allen, supranote 35, at 658.
67. Supra note 49.
68. Chancellor William B. Chandler III, Remarks before the Twelfth Annual
Tulane Corporate Law Institute (Mar. 9, 2000).
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those cases may not have produced the clear legal standards that
some were hoping they did. 69
The leading cases on fiduciary outs focus on the board of directors' duty of care, not its duty of loyalty. The cases turn on an
analysis of the directors' conduct and diligence in the process of
investigating the acquisitions market and negotiating the merger
agreement, not in the fairness to the stockholders of the underlying transaction due to some conflict of interest of the directors or
management. A common theme runs through the cases that have
found violations of this duty of care: the target board of directors'
lack of information on the market for control of the corporation.
Putting aside the "rubber stamp" procedures of the board of directors in Van Gorkom,7 the cases routinely present boards of directors
that agree to a merger agreement containing no-talk and lock-up
provisions without sufficient information. In QVC, for example,
Paramount's board of directors agreed to the corporation's acquisition by Viacom without informing itself as to what another bidder
might pay, even though it already knew that QVC was interested in
an acquisition. Moreover, the merger agreement contained a notalk provision and a "draconian" stock option that effectively precluded consummation of any third-party offer, no matter how
much better for the Paramount stockholders. In Phelps Dodge, the
transcript of the oral ruling is not detailed enough to know how
well the boards of the two merger partners analyzed the market,
but one may infer that they pursued the transaction for strategic
reasons and did not actively consider acquisitions by other parties.
What one can be sure of, however, is that, besides the no-talk provision, the court looked with disfavor upon the size of the termination fee that the parties had negotiated. Finally, in ACE Ltd., the
Capital Re board of directors, without actively considering other
potential suitors, agreed that the corporation could be acquired by
one who was already a substantial stockholder and who had voting
agreements with other major holders that made the stockholder69. Most practitioners would not care how the courts came out on the question of fiduciary outs, just so they handed down a clear rule. The present factbased body of decisions requires additional expense of lawyers' time and efforts in
negotiating merger agreements and increases the risk that after-the-fact judicial
review will prove their advice wrong.
70. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-69 (discussing that the board of directors
approved a merger agreement with little deliberation and without questioning the
per-share acquisition price that the corporation's Chief Executive Officer had
come up with himself).
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approval process a mere formality. In each case, the target board
of directors entered into a merger agreement containing terms
(other than a restrictive fiduciary out or the absence of one altogether) that completely or substantially precluded any superior offer. Moreover, the board agreed to such terms without a meaningful check of the market for control of the corporation.
One may contrast these cases with IXC Communications, in
which the court found no violation of the target board's duty of
care in agreeing to a no-talk provision. Not only did the court
make this finding, but also its entire tone in discussing the concept
of such a provision was far different from the other cases discussed
above. Contrast the court's statements in IXC Communications:
" [p] rovisions such as these are common in merger agreements and
do not imply some automatic breach of fiduciary duty 7 ' with those

in Phelps Dodge "this is the legal equivalent of willful blindness, a
blindness that may constitute a breach of the board's duty of care
.... ,,72

At the heart of the court's decision in IXC Communications is

that the no-talk provision of the merger agreement was agreed to
"late in the process,,7 after IXC Communications had hired an investment banker to discretely, but widely and publicly, announce
that the corporation was for sale and after it had negotiated with a
number of possible buyers.74
Why the difference in these two cases, which were decided
within a thirty-day period and which were ostensibly governed by
the same overarching legal doctrine of the Delaware Supreme

71. In re IXC Communications, Inc. Stockholders Litig., Nos. C.A. 17324, C.A.
17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
72. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. C1V.A.17398,
CIV.A.17383, CIV.A.17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
73. IXC Communications, 1999 WL 1009174, at *6; cf. Rand v. Western Air
Lines, Inc., No.CIV.A.8632, 1994 WL 89006, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994) (deciding that no-talk provision viewed favorably when agreed to after all potential acquirers were canvassed).
74. Even the ACE Ltd. court acknowledged that it might view a no-talk provision differently in the context where the target board of directors had sufficiently
canvassed the market. Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 107 n.36 (Del.
Ch. 1999). Another factor that may have influenced the court is that no thirdparty bidder came forward to challenge the merger in IXC Communications, in contrast to ACE Ltd. and Phelps Dodge. The absence of a challenger would be a rather
unreliable factor on which a court would base its decision, however, since a pre-

clusive merger agreement may cause a bidder to forgo making a challenge altogether and instead set its sights on an easier target. One could be left with the
paradoxical result that the more preclusive the merger agreement, the less likely it
will be subject tojudicial review.
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Court's opinion in Time-Warner. The difference appears to turn on
two factors: first, the extent of the target board's pre-signing information on the market for control of the corporation; and second,
the other provisions of the merger agreement that may deter or
even preclude third-party bids. A target board of directors that
enters into a merger agreement with no fiduciary out faces a substantial risk of after-the-fact judicial review if it did not have sufficient information on the market for acquisition of the corporation
and, perhaps more importantly, if there are substantial impediments to consummation of third-party offers because of financial,
stock, asset, or voting lock-ups. The lack of a fiduciary out, analyzed in isolation, has never been the basis of a reported decision of
a Delaware court enjoining or invalidating the deal-protective
terms of a merger agreement.
Regardless of whether a board of directors' actions are analyzed under the deferential standards of Time-Warner or the more
exacting standards of Revlon, the answer to the question of whether
the inclusion of a fiduciary out76in a merger agreement is legally required in every instance is no. Not by statute or by Delaware caselaw; not by QVC, not even by Phelps Dodge. The impact of this conclusion and the reasons why many boards of directors of targets
(and sometimes acquirers) will nevertheless very often demand and
receive fiduciary outs is discussed in Part IV.
IV. THE EFFECTS AND THE REALITY

Two important questions are raised by the conclusion that fiduciary outs are not legally required in every merger agreement.
75. Marcel Kahan, Paramountor Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover
Jurisprudence,19J. CoRP. L. 583, 605 (1994) (explaining the Revlon and QVCdecisions as the Delaware courts presenting target boards with the choice of giving
stockholders a meaningful opportunity to reject the directors' decision or of facing enhanced review of their actions); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger
Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REv. 239,
249 (1990) ("The critical issue thus is not whether the target board has the power
to grant exclusivity provisions, but what the board can do to prevent competing
bids.").
76. One must be careful to distinguish among fiduciary outs to the four different contractual provisions discussed above, however. A court would likely look
more favorably on the absence of the target board's ability to terminate the
agreement in the face of a higher offer than it would on the absence of a fiduciary
out from the board's agreement to recommend that stockholders vote to approve
the merger agreement or to refrain from providing confidential information to
potential other bidders.
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First, if that conclusion differs from widely held beliefs in the
mergers-and-acquisitions market, as this author believes is true,
then what will be the effects on the players in that market, including acquiring and target corporations and their stockholders? Second, given the fact that fiduciary outs were often included in nonRevlon transactions before the Delaware Chancery Court gave practitioners a reason to be more vigilant in this area, isn't that evidence that there may be valid reasons why parties to a merger
agreement would include a fiduciary out for the target board of directors, even if not required by law to do so? The final part of this
article will analyze these two questions.
A.

The Effects
1.

BargainingPower And Stockholders' Interests

The first effect of recognizing the conclusion that a fiduciary
out is not a legally mandated requirement for every merger agreement may be a shift in bargaining power from target corporations
to acquirers. If the parties begin their negotiations with the premise that, by law, there must be a fiduciary out, the target board does
not have to "give up" anything to get it. The parties may still negotiate the exact wording of the fiduciary out from the many forms
available, but the initial inclusion of such a provision will not be
fought over; it will be taken as a given. In contrast, if the parties
start from the default position that no fiduciary out is required, the
target corporation will have to bargain for the benefits of the out:
increased information regarding the acquisition market for the corporation, the possibility of increased value for its stockholders, and
the decreased chance of expensive litigation that may consume
directors' and management's time and attention and delay consummation of the transaction. The receipt of these benefits is not
free, however. To obtain them, the target corporation may have to
settle for a lower purchase price or more disadvantageous terms of
the merger agreement.
The magnitude of this shift in bargaining power, and even its
existence at all, is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of
this article. It bears noting, however, that whether such a shift
would indeed be forthcoming is open to debate. Potential acquirers, with greater certainty that their contractual expectations will be
enforced, may be enticed to make their initial acquisition offers at
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a higher value.77 Acquiring corporations would not have to discount their initial offer prices because they would no longer be
dealing with such "unreliable contracting partners." 78 Target
stockholders may also benefit from the absence of a phenomenon
that is presently not observable: at the margin, some potential acquirers may currently be deterred by the uncertainty of after-thefact judicial review from entering into a merger agreement in the
first place 9
The board of directors of the target corporation also has an interest in reducing the ability of the acquiring corporation (in the
absence of a successful third-party bidder) to abandon the merger.
Except in rare instances, the acquiring corporation's "outs" are
couched in terms of financing contingencies or a requirement that
no material adverse changes to the target corporation shall have
80
occurred between executing the merger agreement and closing.
If the acquiring corporation exercises any of these outs, the effects
on the target corporation can be disastrous: even if wholly unwarranted, it may be seen as "damaged goods," for which no other potential acquirer would pay nearly the same acquisition price. To
the extent that a target board may substantially reduce the ability of
the acquiring corporation to terminate the merger agreement by
eliminating the target's fiduciary out, the target corporation's
stockholders should benefit.8 '
The overriding concern of the courts in cases such as Revlon
and QVC is ensuring that target stockholders obtain the highest
value reasonably obtainable for their shares. A merger is an extraordinary event in the life of a corporation and the sale of control
and the resulting payment of a control premium is even more extraordinary. For target stockholders in the Revlon zone, the proposed merger results in a double whammy: the end of their invest77. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1563 (9th
Cir. 1984); Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 285; Taylor, supra note 33, at 625-26.
This, of course, assumes that, unlike in Van Gorkom, there is true arm's-length bar-

gaining and that the board of directors of the target corporation has engaged in
something more than a mere cursory review of the acquisitions market before the
agreement is executed.
78. Johnston & Alexander, supra note 11, at 19.
79. Allen, supra note 35, at 655 & n.8.
80. E.g., Rand v. W. Air Lines, Inc., No.CIV.A.8632, 1994 WL 89006, at *2
(Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994).
81. Id. at *6-7 (deciding that acquirer's ability to terminate in response to a
material adverse change was weakened in exchange for no-talk provisions binding
the target); Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 284-85.
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ment in the corporation in which they had initially invested and
the sale of an asset that is uniquely theirs: the control premium for
their shares. If there is indeed a shift in bargaining power from
targets to acquirers, what kind and degree of harm will befall these
stockholders? The answer is not clear. Intuitively, one would think
that the heightened judicial scrutiny of Van Gorkom, Revlon, and
QVC would serve as a strong deterrent against director negligence.
It would seem to follow that anything that weakens this deterrent
effect would hinder the goal of price maximization, so crucial to
the Delaware courts in the change-of-control context. Briefly mentioned above, however, were certain factors that could cause an exclusive merger agreement to result in a net benefit, rather than a
loss, for target stockholders. First, there is the possibility that acquiring corporations will no longer discount their offer prices to
reflect the uncertainty of a non-exclusive merger agreement or a
highly fact-based judicial review. Second, there is the possibility
that more acquisitions, and thus the greater likelihood of the payment of a control premium to the target stockholders, will occur at
the margin. Either of these two benefits may offset the costs associated with the shift in bargaining power. But are there other offsets
that may occur when the cost/benefit analysis is performed at the
macro level?
One may assume that there is a construct called "target stockholders," made up of persons that somehow invest only in corporations that will, sooner or later, find themselves offered an acquisition proposal that their boards of directors determine is too good
to refuse." These stockholders may be harmed by weakened judicial scrutiny in that acquirers will not be compelled to offer maximum acquisition premiums."' Perhaps these stockholders will
82. Under Delaware law, most believe that a target board of directors, exercising its business judgment, may always 'just say no" to an unwanted acquisition bid,
so long as it says "no" to all acquisition bids. Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of
Being Earnest: Paramount Reurites the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Take-

overs, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 146 n.85 (1994) (citing various authorities). This results in the paradox that the courts take a greater interest when the choice is between the receipt of a given premium and the receipt of a slightly larger premium
than they do when the choice is between a given premium and none at all. In the
first scenario, the stockholders always have the final say (in the absence of preclusive lock-ups); in the second, their only option is to wage an expensive proxy contest to replace the directors with persons more receptive to an acquisition offer,
assuming that the target stockholders know about the rejected bid. It seems that
the courts' attention in this area may be misplaced.
83. The theory that the acquisitions market, rather than the courts, will nev-
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come out even because the possible costs and benefits of the determination that fiduciary outs are not always legally required will
cancel one another out. Or perhaps, for the reasons discussed
above, the potential benefits will outweigh the perceived costs.
Without empirical evidence, one cannot be sure.
One could also assume that there is a construct called "acquiring stockholders," made up of persons that somehow invest only in
corporations that always acquire other corporations and are never
themselves the subject of acquisition proposals. 84 How would these
stockholders fare if fiduciary outs were not recognized as being
mandated in every instance? In essence, the possibilities are the reverse of those listed above for target stockholders. The stockholders may benefit, especially if acquiring corporations are routinely
overpaying in acquisitions and this recognition would reduce the
amount of acquisition premiums. They may be harmed if the
number of acquisitions or the premiums paid actually increase instead and if such acquisitions and payments do not create value for
the acquiring corporation, but merely represent a wealth transfer
from the acquiring to the target stockholders. And, like target
stockholders, they may also come out unaffected.
Without empirical evidence, how can one know if the conclusion expressed in Part III is a good thing or a bad thing for stockholders? First, there is the rather unhelpful answer that one may
never know. There are too many variables that cloud the analysis
and prevent the making of any meaningful empirical conclusions.
Second, however, is the theory that it does not matter. The constructs created above are not realistic. There are no distinct groups
of target stockholders and acquiring stockholders. Because of the
prevalence of merger transactions, one who holds a diversified
portfolio of equity securities should, over time, hold shares in
roughly an equal number of targets and acquirers. Just as holding
a diversified portfolio will mitigate or eliminate economic or business risk unique to a particular corporation (as opposed to general
ertheless force acquirers to put their best offer forward will be discussed in section
IV.B., infra.
84. The January 2001 Time Warner/America Online merger, valued at approximately $103.5 billion (or $165 billion when the deal was signed in January
2000), is evidence that no corporation is too large to be acquired, however (absent
antitrust concerns).
85. Miriam P. Hechler, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of Bidder and Target
Stockholders, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 319, 322-26 (discussing the absence of protections for acquiring stockholders from their corporation paying too much).
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market risk) , so too should it mitigate or eliminate the risk of any
additional costs imposed on target or acquiring stockholders in a
given instance. 87 Stockholders with diversified portfolios should
only be concerned that a merger creates rather than destroys
wealth, 88 not how the created wealth is allocated between the acquiring and target corporations and their stockholders.8 9 In the
words of two respected commentators: "Any attempt to set fair
prices for corporate control transactions, in the name of protecting
investors who chose not to diversify, penalizes other investors who
eliminate risk through diversification, and in the process it reduces
the number of value-increasing transactions. " 9°
If portfolio diversification means that there are no real economic effects of concluding that fiduciary outs are not legally mandated in all instances, then isn't this, in the words of Chancellor Allen, "much ado about not very much?" 9' The remainder of this
article will contend that it is not.
2.

The JudicialSystem

As was noted above, the vast majority of cases challenging directors' conduct in the merger context allege violations of the directors' duty of care. Much of the judicial system's time and effort
is expended in second-guessing directors' actions. The deference
of the business judgment rule under Delaware and other states'
corporate laws recognizes that judges are not businesspeople and
that they are poor in reviewing the reasonableness of directors'
business judgments. Thus, a good deal of judicial resources are
used attempting to tackle a problem where the courts' prowess
does not lie.
The question of how much information on the acquisition
market for a corporation is enough before entering into a merger
agreement is a business judgment, in which the target board of di-

86. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYRES, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 155-59 (4th ed. 1991).

87. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698, 712-13 (1982).
88. The debate on this topic is voluminous, continuing to develop, and beyond the scope of this article. For a recent summary of the debate, see generally
Hechler, supra note 85.
89. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 87, at 713.

90.

Id.

91.

Allen, supranote 35, at 659.
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rectors and its advisers' 92 experience and expertise overshadow that
of judges, similar to other agreements a corporation may enter
into.9' Also a business judgment for the directors and their advisers
is the question of when and if the absence of a fiduciary out is necessary to avoid losing the interest of a prospective acquirer. So too
is the analysis of the costs, in terms of less favorable contractual
terms, of a target corporation bargaining for a fiduciary out. As
long as there is no self-dealing by directors and as long as stockholders remain free to vote against the merger, courts should not
second-guess directors' business judgments regarding these questions.9 In the words of the Jewel court, "[f] ull discretion regarding
the terms of the agreement lies with the board, the ultimate determination with the stockholders."0' This, of course, requires that directors actually exercise their business judgment in good faith.9r
The rare instances of egregious shirking by directors should be easier for courts to decide than the true judgment calls that are more
prevalent in complex business transactions such as mergers.
Although dwarfed in number and attention by the landmark
cases involving directors' duty of care, violations of the duty of loyalty and the ancillary duty of candor to stockholders are both more
threatening to a well-working and informed market for corporate
control and more in line with questions that courts are proficient
in deciding. Given this, courts should save their enhanced scrutiny
for two scenarios that throw a wrench into the market for acquisition of a target corporation and prevent stockholders from making
an informed decision on whether or not to approve a merger. The
first situation is when there are allegations that the target directors
or members of senior management have undisclosed self interests
92. Delaware statutory law provides that directors may rely on expert opinions, assuming such reliance is justified. DEL. CODE ANN. tit
8, § 141(e) (1999).
The corporation statutes of other states contain similar provisions. E.g., MINN.
STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 2 (2000).
93. A number of commentators, however, emphasize the qualitative distinctions between ordinary "enterprise" contracts, relating to the corporation's day-today business affairs, and "ownership" contracts, such as merger agreements. E.g.,
Regan, supra note 57, at 90-100.
94. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 285 (2d Cir.
1986) (NewYork law) (Kearse,J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]hus, absent evidence
of bad faith or fraud ... the courts must and properly should respect [corporate
directors'] determinations.").
95. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 471 F.2d 1555, 1562 (9th
Cir. 1984).
96. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (recognizing a board of directors may not

abdicate its dutiesjust because stockholders will make the final decision).
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in the proposed merger. Such interests may well constitute a hidden side payment that diverts part of the acquisition premium from
stockholders to their fiduciaries. If disclosed, stockholders may
make up their own minds on whether the interests are legitimate; if
undisclosed, the stockholders are being cheated. Second is the
analysis of whether the provisions of the merger agreement designed to protect the acquirer's investment are reasonable attempts
to quantify the monetary and opportunity costs incurred by the acquirer should it lose out to a third-party bidder."' These provisions
may be so draconian or preclusive of other acquisition offers that
the stockholders' vote is a foregone conclusion, not because the
deal is so attractive, but rather because there is no other alternative
or because the effects of a negative vote would be economically disastrous. s If an alternative transaction is truly better for the target
stockholders, and if they are free to vote down the first offer to accept the alternative, one may be sure that competing bidders will
use their substantial resources in an attempt to persuade the stockholders; courts need not interfere. 99 In the words of Chancellor
Chandler, "when the arsenals of all parties have been unleashed so
97. Termination fees are often analogized to liquidated-damages provisions,
which courts are accustomed to reviewing. A termination fee may be more likely
to be upheld if it meets the court's criteria for liquidated damages instead of a
penalty provision. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635
A.2d 1245, 1271 (Del. Ch. 1993), affd on other grounds, 637 A.2d 34 (1994) (holding that a $100 million termination fee "represent[ed] a fair liquidated amount to
cover [the acquirer's] expenses should ... the merger not be consummated"). In
Delaware, liquidated damages are evaluated using a two-prong test: whether "the
Lee
damages are uncertain and the amount agreed upon is reasonable .
Builders, Inc. v. Wells, 103 A.2d 918, 919 (Del. Ch. 1954). The law of other states
is similar.
98. The question of the permissible bounds of lock-ups is unsettled and beyond the scope of this article. For two sides of the debate on this question, compare Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Marketfor CorporateControl
48 STAN. L. REv. 1539, 1564-66 (1996) (suggesting that courts closely scrutinize
"second-bidder" and "anticipatory" lock-ups but grant deference to "first-bidder"
lock-ups), with Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103
YALE L.J. 1739, 1834 (1994) (arguing that courts should uphold all lock-ups). A
substantial termination fee is more likely to be looked favorably upon if it is conditioned upon the target stockholders receiving the benefits of a superior third-party
offer, rather than just voting down the first offer. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp.,
No. CIV.A.16963, 2000 WL 516265, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2000).
99. Again, the stockholders' vote must be informed. Of the four types of fi-

duciary outs, the outs from the target board's agreements to recommend that
stockholders vote for the merger and to avoid providing confidential information
to third parties are the most important to an informed vote and thus likely to be

required in most, but not all, merger agreements that contain such agreements.
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as to fully and completely educate the stockholders of their choices,
it is not for this Court to ride to their rescue. " I°°
Even if courts give less attention and more leeway to the processes followed by boards of directors in approving a merger agreement, and more attention and heightened scrutiny to protecting
the stockholders' free and informed exercise of their franchise, the
inclusion of fiduciary outs will likely continue to be common practice. The next section discusses why.
B.

The Reality

First, it is false distinction to say that fiduciary outs only benefit
target stockholders and that only target boards of directors will
seek their inclusion in a merger agreement. Depending on the circumstances, both the target and the acquiring corporation may
have a common interest in providing for a fiduciary out for the target board of directors. If the termination fee payable by the target
and the other consequences of exercising the fiduciary out are reasonable approximations of the costs incurred by the acquiring corporation, and assuming that the target stockholders are free to vote
against the merger, then the parties' interests are aligned. The target corporation wants to be able to negotiate with the bidder that
comes out of the woodwork to offer a higher price for the corporation lest that bidder move on to other potential targets. The acquiring corporation, in the absence of preclusive lock-up devices in
the merger agreement, knows that the stockholder vote would be a
foregone conclusion and that the merger agreement it has negotiated will be rejected. Given this, the acquiring corporation would
rather cut its losses, receive its termination fee sooner rather than
later, and focus on its business or the next potential target. The fiduciary out is a benefit for both parties.
Second, a target board of directors may not have been able to
undertake an adequate analysis of the acquisitions market before
entering into the merger agreement, thus may wish to include a fiduciary out. Many legitimate reasons may account for this failure.
First, the fear of information leaks, which may drive up the target
corporation's stock price, making the acquisition price appear to
the target stockholders to represent only a small premium, and
which may foster fear and rumors among the target's employees,
100. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. CIV.A.17398,
CIV.A.17383, CIV.A.17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
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customers, and suppliers. Second, the uncertainty among key executives and others involved in the acquisition process, who may be
severely distracted from their regular duties and who may fear for
their own future in the combined organization. Third, timing pressure from the acquiring corporation, which, in addition to the
concerns expressed in Part II above, may wish to have the transaction signed and closed by the end of its fiscal year or some other
key date.
Because of these pressures, the target board of directors may
justifiably be unable to gauge the interests of possible acquisition
prices payable by other potential acquirers. A target board that
finds itself it this situation will reasonably fear an after-the-fact judicial review of its compliance with the duty of care, even under a
more deferential standard of review. Directors in such a situation
may bargain for a fiduciary out to obtain more information about
the acquisitions market and to consider higher offers. In exchange, however, the board will often have to give something up,
such as a higher termination fee payable if a third-party offer is accepted or other pro-acquirer provisions of the merger agreement.
Third, fiduciary outs will generally be included because in
questions involving directors' fiduciary duties, the Delaware courts
have broad equitable powers to do what is "right" in a given case,
even if there is no clear precedent for their actions. The equitable
principles that govern the courts' actions lead to fact-specific rulings, as discussed above, and not to bright-line rules that may guide
the actions of future parties to merger agreements. 01 Thus, there
is always a risk in predicting how a court will rule in this area. Indeed, the current state of the law is in flux regarding what standard
of review the courts will apply to exclusive merger agreements, even
under the deferential standard of Time-Warner. A fiduciary out
may lessen this risk by avoiding the possibility of suit in the first
place, because the possibility of a superior third-party offer is expressly recognized and the procedures and consequences regarding its consideration and acceptance are clearly set out. The inclusion of a fiduciary out may also lessen the risk faced by the target

101. Allen, supra note 35, at 559.
102. Cf Phelps Dodge, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (recognizing no-talk provision
without a fiduciary out was viewed with a highly critical eye); In re IXC Communications, Inc. Stockholders Litig., Nos. C.A. 17324, C.A. 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (recognizing no-talk provision given deference under
the business judgment rule).
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board because it may have the effect of causing the court to apply
the more deferential business judgment rule, thereby shifting the
risk ofjudicial error to plaintiffs."' Finally, a fiduciary out may protect target directors by delaying the time at which they have to
make a final decision on the advisability of one transaction over all
others until such time as all the relevant information has come to
light. °4 Many times, no third-party offer will be forthcoming and
the directors will not have to make such a decision at all.
For these reasons, parties to merger agreements may ignore
the legal analysis of courts and some commentators, may put aside
their attorneys' negotiating positions on whether or not a fiduciary
out is a legally required term of a merger agreement, and may instead find a fiduciary out to be a practical solution to market risks
and the problem of limited information.
V.

CONCLUSION

Fiduciary outs are important and heavily negotiated provisions
of merger agreements. Unfortunately, the Delaware courts have
led many to believe that they are required terms in all merger
agreements involving publicly held corporations. Instead of oftenartificial distinctions driven by whether or not the target corporation is engaging in a sale-of-control transaction, the courts' decisions appear to turn on two factors: the extent of the target board's
information on the market for control of the corporation and the
other provisions of the merger agreement that may deter or even
preclude third-party bids. Recognizing that fiduciary outs are not
legally required in every merger agreement may be seen to cause a
shift in bargaining power from target corporations to acquirers, but
in reality this should have little or no impact on stockholders holding a diversified portfolio of equity securities in a number of companies. It is hoped that this recognition will cause courts to spend
less time and resources in analyzing directors' compliance with the
duty of care and instead focus their energies on wrongs that they
are better equipped to analyze and that truly create an adverse impact on a well-working acquisitions market: directors' violations of
their duty of loyalty and agreement provisions that preclude stockholders from accepting an unsolicited topping bid.

103.
104.

Allen, supra note 35, at 559.
Id. at 660.
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